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Abstract
Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information
learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply
being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such
that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that
licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to
perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task,
leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two
types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many
stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of
the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits
and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting
mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would
spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more
frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these
generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory errors for the general-
izable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover,
the same generalizable-versus-idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cog-
nitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background,
requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias
to draw generalizations about kinds.
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Humans conceive of the world as being populated not just by unique individuals (e.g.,
the tall leafy thing in the front yard) but also by kinds of things (e.g., trees). What is
more, we routinely acquire and store knowledge at the level of these abstract kinds, and
we use this knowledge with amazing flexibility to communicate with one another, explain
the world around us, and predict future outcomes (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Markman, 1989;
Murphy, 2002; Smith & Medin, 1981). These achievements are all the more remarkable
considering that we do not in fact have perceptual access to kinds per se—only to partic-
ular samples. To some researchers, the accumulated evidence in the psychology of con-
cepts has suggested that, beyond being merely capable of reasoning about kinds, human
cognition may actually be structured so as to privilege the processing of information at
this general level (e.g., Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Gelman, 2010; Hampton, 2012;
Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002; Leslie, 2008, 2012).
According to these arguments, reasoning about kinds requires few cognitive resources
compared to reasoning about sets of comparable scope. Consider some of the developmen-
tal evidence on this point. Children’s ability to evaluate claims about entire kinds (e.g.,
“Do girls have curly hair?”) is adult-like starting at around the age of 3, whereas their abil-
ity to evaluate claims about similarly broad quantified sets (e.g., “Do all girls have curly
hair?”) has a much more protracted developmental course (Hollander et al., 2002; Mann-
heim, Gelman, Escalante, Huayhua, & Puma, 2011; Tardif, Gelman, Fu, & Zhu, 2012).
This developmental pattern—which has been found in children learning languages from
three different language families (English, Mandarin, and Quechua)—is particularly strik-
ing when taking into account the fact that, from the perspective of formal semantics, state-
ments about kinds are more complex than quantified statements. To illustrate the formal
complexity of statements about kinds (or generic statements), consider that one can truth-
fully say that mosquitoes carry malaria but not that books are paperbacks, even though
the majority of books are paperbacks, and only a tiny percentage of mosquitoes carry
malaria (e.g., Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie, & Glucksberg, 2013). Because of puzzling exam-
ples such as these, a formal account of the truth conditions of generic statements has
eluded semanticists for over 40 years (e.g., Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Lawler, 1973; but
see Leslie, 2008). In contrast, specifying the truth conditions for quantified statements is
often formally simple (e.g., the truth of a universally quantified statement is determined by
a clear rule: the statement is true if and only if every single category member has the
described property). Thus, the cognitive ease with which children understand generics
(which are formally complex), coupled with the cognitive difficulties children encounter
with quantified claims (which are formally simple), is suggestive of a bias in the architec-
ture of our cognitive systems—a bias that enables reasoning about kinds to be so effortless
that even young children can perform such formally complex reasoning competently.
These ease-of-processing claims (i.e., that reasoning about kinds requires few cognitive
resources) are not restricted to children. For instance, when adults have to evaluate or
remember quantified facts, they often respond as if these facts were about kinds (Leslie &
Gelman, 2012; Leslie, Khemlani, & Glucksberg, 2011; Meyer, Gelman, & Stilwell, 2011;
see also Hampton, 2012; J€onsson & Hampton, 2006). To illustrate, Leslie and Gelman
(2012) asked children and adults to remember both generic facts (e.g., “Bees have five
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eyes”) and quantified facts (e.g., “All bees have five eyes”) for a later memory test. At both
ages, participants were more likely to mistakenly recall quantified statements as generics
than to mistakenly recall generics as quantified statements. This result, which was bol-
stered by follow-up studies ruling out alternative explanations, seems consistent with the
ease-of-processing argument above: If quantified information is more cognitively challeng-
ing to process and store than the corresponding generic information, then participants may
inadvertently default to the latter and thus recall quantified information as generic.
In this article, we investigate another potential cognitive bias that may privilege rea-
soning and learning about kinds: namely, a bias to make generalizations about kinds. That
is, we propose that, whenever people encounter evidence that could reasonably be
extended to a kind, they will routinely formulate implicit generalizations that take this
evidence and apply it to the kind as a whole. Moreover, these generalizations are hypoth-
esized to be spontaneous, occurring without any sort of external encouragement or
prompt. Similar to the ease-of-processing bias described above, this generalization bias
gives rise to many kind representations that we would not have formed otherwise. How-
ever, the process by which it does so is quite different: The kind representations created
through the hypothesized generalization bias are not the byproducts of an inability to pro-
cess quantified information—they are not the side effects of our cognitive limitations.
Rather, they are the outcome of inferences (inductive generalizations, to be more precise)
that our cognitive systems spontaneously perform “behind the scenes” when encountering
information about sets of objects in the world.
Our proposal of a generalization bias builds on the extensive research suggesting that
people are able to draw kind-wide conclusions from relatively sparse evidence. For exam-
ple, adults often judge that a property that is present in a minority of the members of a
kind (e.g., 30% of morseths have silver fur) is likely to be true of the kind as a whole
(e.g., morseths, as a kind, have silver fur; Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010).
Similarly, the developmental literature on inductive inferences has suggested that even
very young children can generalize information from one member of a kind to another
arbitrary member—and thus, arguably, to the entire kind (e.g., Gelman & Markman,
1986, 1987; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; Keates & Graham, 2008; Sutherland &
Friedman, 2012, 2013; see also Cimpian & Park, 2014; Csibra & Gergely, 2009).
These findings, however, do not provide evidence for the stronger claim of a bias to
generalize to kinds. These previous results suggest that people will often draw conclu-
sions about kinds when they are provided with explicit opportunities to do so. For
instance, Cimpian et al. (2010) data show that people generalize certain quantified facts
to the level of kinds when they are asked whether these generalizations are warranted. It
remains unclear, however, if people would have drawn the generic conclusions they did
without the experimenter’s prompt. The same point applies to the developmental evi-
dence: The experiments that explored children’s generalizations typically provided clear,
explicit opportunities for children to make such generalizations. For example, children
might be given some information about one member of a kind (e.g., this bird feeds its
babies mashed-up food) and then asked if another member of that kind also possesses
that feature (e.g., does this other bird feed its babies mashed-up food?; e.g., Gelman &
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Markman, 1986, 1987). Stronger evidence is needed to demonstrate the existence of a
bias to generalize to categories. That is, we would need evidence that people make cate-
gory generalizations spontaneously, in the absence of any external prompts or incentives
—or, perhaps, even in the presence of disincentives.
In the studies reported here, we tested whether people spontaneously generalize quanti-
fied evidence to the level of a kind in a context where such generalizations actually dis-
tract participants from the goal of the task at hand (because generalizing leads to
incorrect answers). The task, modeled after Leslie and Gelman (2012), is ostensibly about
people’s memory for generic and quantified facts about novel animals. In reality, how-
ever, our reason for adopting it was that it can reveal whether people use the evidence
provided by the quantified facts (e.g., all zorbs eat fruits and vegetables) to draw sponta-
neous generalizations about the relevant kinds (e.g., zorbs eat fruits and vegetables).1 If
participants did so, their gist memory for the quantified facts would arguably be influ-
enced by these generalizations; as a result, they may misremember some of the facts that
were originally quantified as being generic on a memory test. Such generalization-induced
memory errors, if they occurred, would be both spontaneous (rather than externally
prompted) and counter to the incentive structure of the task (where accurate memory was
the only criterion for success). Thus, from the novel perspective outlined here, the evi-
dence from this task could speak to the presence of a bias to generalize to categories.
The use of this memory paradigm, however, gives rise to a problem: The prediction of
our generalization bias is, at this point, indistinguishable from that of the ease-of-process-
ing bias. That is, both accounts predict frequent conversions from quantified to generic
form—albeit for different reasons. While our account suggests that these conversions are
a result of spontaneous generalizations, the ease-of-processing account suggests that the
conversions would be a result of the resource-intensive nature of processing quantified
information, which should lead participants to inadvertently fall back on the easier-to-
process kind representations. To circumvent this ambiguity, we manipulated the content
of the facts participants were asked to remember. That is, half of the facts described
properties that are typically generalizable to an entire animal kind (e.g., diet, habitat),
whereas the other half described properties that are typically idiosyncratic to a particular
individual (e.g., temporary states, accidents). There is extensive evidence that kind gener-
alizations are sensitive to the content of the property being generalized (e.g., Cimpian &
Markman, 2008; Cimpian et al., 2010; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Markman, 1986). This
sensitivity to content is, in part, rooted in what are known as overhypotheses (e.g., Dewar
& Xu, 2010; Goodman, 1955; Shipley, 1993). Overhypotheses are abstract beliefs that
specify the types of properties that are likely to be uniform across members of a certain
type of category (e.g., categories of animals have uniform diets: horses eat hay, birds eat
seeds, etc.). We chose our generalizable properties so as to fit under common overhy-
potheses people might have about animal kinds (e.g., diet: “All zorbs eat fruits and vege-
tables”), which might thus facilitate kind generalizations from quantified evidence
concerning these properties. In turn, because of these generalizations, people should be
significantly more likely to misremember quantified facts as generic when the facts are
about generalizable properties than when they are about idiosyncratic properties.
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Importantly, this prediction is distinct from the prediction of the ease-of-processing
claim, which provides no reason to expect an asymmetry in memory errors for generic
and quantified facts based on the content of the properties they describe. The ease-of-pro-
cessing account would instead predict that a quantified fact, regardless of what type of
property it is about, is still quantified and thus would be more cognitively taxing to
remember, causing people to fall back on an easier-to-process kind representation. (There-
fore, in the context of the present task, the ease-of-processing account predicts that we
should find more conversions from quantified facts to generic facts for both property
types. If this prediction is supported, the present studies would also serve as a replication
of Leslie & Gelman, 2012, and thus provide additional support for the ease-of-processing
account.)
In addition to providing evidence for a generalization bias, the present research also
sought to investigate some of its characteristics. In particular, we investigated the extent
to which this bias can operate in the background, without diverting cognitive resources
away from the focus of one’s attention. We explored this issue empirically by placing
half of the participants under a cognitive load while they were encoding the quantified
and generic statements. If the bias to generalize to kinds operates without requiring much
cognitive effort, then the participants who are under cognitive load should also misre-
member the quantified facts as generic more often when these facts are about generaliz-
able (vs. idiosyncratic) properties. Such a result would speak to the low-demand nature of
this bias, as well as to the power it has to shape our conceptual knowledge without inter-
fering with ongoing cognitive activities.
To summarize, we proposed that people have a bias to make generalizations about cat-
egories. If such a bias were in place, then one symptom of it should be a tendency to
make spontaneous kind generalizations even in contexts where such generalizations are
unwelcome. In the current memory paradigm, such spontaneous generalizations should
lead people to mistakenly recall quantified facts as generic, and these mistakes should be
more frequent when the facts are about generalizable properties (which facilitate the
unwanted kind generalizations) than when the facts are about idiosyncratic properties. By
manipulating whether participants had to perform a concurrent task while encoding the
generic and quantified facts, we were also able to test whether this generalization bias
requires only minimal cognitive resources to operate. Experiments 1 to 4 provided consis-
tent support for our proposal of a generalization bias. In addition, Experiments 2 to 4
addressed two alternative explanations for the findings.
1. Experiment 1
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants
The participants were 187 undergraduate students from a large public university in the
Midwestern United States. All were native English speakers. The reward for participation
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was course credit or $5. Participants were randomly assigned to either a no-load (n = 93)
or a cognitive-load (n = 94) condition.
1.1.2. Items
We used 16 facts about novel animals (see Table 1), each of which could be presented
either as universally quantified (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”) or as generic
(e.g., “Zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”). However, the same fact was never presented in
both forms to the same participant. In addition, half of the facts described generalizable
properties (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half described idiosyncratic properties
(e.g., getting mud in their hair). The generalizable and idiosyncratic properties were
matched in average length (both Ms = 4.75 words). Moreover, in a separate norming
study, we asked participants (N = 43) to judge how many members of a kind were likely
to possess these properties (e.g., “If you had to guess, what percentage of stups get mud
in their hair?”), given that at least one member of the kind had the property. The results
confirmed that all the generalizable properties were indeed judged to be more generaliz-
able (range = 75.1%–85.7% of category members have the property) than all of the
idiosyncratic properties (range = 14.0%–55.4%); this difference was significant,
Mgeneralizable = 80.9% versus Midiosyncratic = 42.2%, t(42) = 9.56, p < .001.
Table 1
The 16 items, in generic and universally quantified format
Property Type
Fact Format
Generic Universally Quantified
Generalizablea Cheebas sleep through the winter All cheebas sleep through the winter
Daxes keep food in their cheeks All daxes keep food in their cheeks
Reesles like to swim in the ocean All reesles like to swim in the ocean
Blins sweat through their paws All blins sweat through their paws
Mooks shed their skin every year All mooks shed their skin every year
Zorbs eat fruits and vegetables All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables
Lorches taste with their feet All lorches taste with their feet
Glippets build their nests on mountain peaks All glippets build their nests on mountain
peaks
Idiosyncraticb Stups get mud in their hair All stups get mud in their hair
Ollers have broken legs All ollers have broken legs
Ackles get fungus infections in their ears All ackles get fungus infections in their ears
Kweps chip their teeth on nuts All kweps chip their teeth on nuts
Zoovs fall out of trees while sleeping All zoovs fall out of trees while sleeping
Kazzes trip over logs and rocks All kazzes trip over logs and rocks
Sapers twist their ankles All sapers twist their ankles
Flooms get dust on their faces All flooms get dust on their faces
aThe memory clues for the generalizable properties were as follows: “cheeba” and “winter,” “dax” and
“cheek,” “reesle” and “ocean,” “blin” and “paw,” “mook” and “skin,” “zorb” and “vegetable,” “lorch” and
“foot,” “glippet” and “mountain.”
bThe memory clues for the idiosyncratic properties were as follows: “stup” and “hair,” “oller” and “leg,” “ackle”
and “ear,” “kwep” and “tooth,” “zoov” and “tree,” “kazz” and “rock,” “saper” and “ankle,” “floom” and “face.”
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The 16 facts were presented in one of three random orders, each of which had two ver-
sions. The three random orders were generated with the constraint that no more than three
facts of the same form (i.e., “all” or generic) or containing the same type of property
(i.e., generalizable or idiosyncratic) should occur in a row. The two versions of each
order were identical except with respect to the generic/universal form of each fact: If a
fact was generic in one version, it was universally quantified in the other version, and
vice versa.
1.1.3. Procedure and design
Testing occurred in small groups of up to six participants. To avoid overwhelming par-
ticipants’ memory capacity, the 16 facts were split into two blocks of eight, each of
which contained four facts in generic form and four in “all” form, as well as four gener-
alizable and four idiosyncratic properties. The same three-phase procedure, described
next, was followed for both blocks.
1.1.3.1. Learning phase: In the no-load condition, the experimenter asked participants to
pay close attention to the sentences because they would be asked to recall them in a later
test. Then, she read aloud the eight facts from the first block. As the participants listened
to the facts, they followed along in a booklet that contained only line drawings of the
novel animals referenced in these facts (and not the facts themselves). The procedure for
the cognitive load condition was identical, except that participants were also asked to
rehearse a string of six digits while listening to the facts and following along in their
booklets. Immediately after listening to the facts, participants were asked to recall the
digits in the order in which they were presented (for similar methods of inducing cogni-
tive demands, see Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
1.1.3.2. Distractor phase: All participants were then asked to complete a 4-min distrac-
tor task in which they completed a series of multi-digit multiplication problems.
1.1.3.3. Recall phase: Next, participants received a second booklet with the same draw-
ings as the booklet from the learning phase. Participants were asked to go through the
booklet and write what they remembered of the sentences that the experimenter had read
for each page. They were asked to write in full sentences. Because our main interest was
in participants’ memory for the scope of the facts (generic vs. “all”) rather than in their
memory for the content of these facts, we provided two strong clues to the content of
each sentence: the bare singular form of the relevant novel noun (e.g., zorb) and an addi-
tional noun from the fact (e.g., vegetable; see Table 1 for full list of clues).
Once participants finished writing down their recall responses for the first block, the
three phases (learning, distractor, and recall) were repeated for the second block of eight
sentences.2
The design of our study can be summarized as follows: 2 (fact form: generic vs. “all”;
within subject) 9 2 (property type: generalizable vs. idiosyncratic; within subject) 9 2
(cognitive load: load vs. no load; between subjects).
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1.1.4. Coding
One researcher coded participants’ recalled sentences into one of three mutually exclu-
sive categories depending on their scope: generic, “all,” and “other” (which also included
failures to recall anything). If a sentence was about a kind as a whole (e.g., “Zorbs like
to eat vegetables”), it was coded as generic.3 If a sentence was about all members of a
kind (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”), it was coded as “all.” If a sentence was
about a single instance of a kind or had indeterminate scope (e.g., “Eat fruits and vegeta-
bles”), it was coded as “other.” These three categories accounted for 49.7%, 31.0%, and
19.4% of participants’ responses, respectively.4 A second researcher, blind to the load
condition and the original form of the fact, coded the responses of 167 of the 187 sub-
jects (20 subjects were used for training). Cohen’s kappas for the generic, “all,” and
“other” coding categories were .97, 1.0, and .95, respectively, and disagreements were
resolved through discussion.
We also coded cognitive load participants’ memory for the digits they were asked to
rehearse while they were listening to the facts. Two researchers independently rated each
participant’s recalled digit strings on a scale from 1 [completely wrong or missing] to 5
[completely correct].5 Interrater agreement was high, r = .93. Each subject’s final rating
was the average of the two researchers’ ratings, except in cases where their scores dif-
fered by more than one point. In such cases, the researchers discussed the disagreement
and reached a mutually agreeable rating.
1.1.5. Dependent measure
In light of the prior evidence for the efficiency of kind-based computations (e.g.,
Hollander et al., 2002; Leslie & Gelman, 2012), it is likely that participants will, on
the whole, be more likely to mistakenly recall “all” statements as generic rather than
the reverse. Our proposal of a bias to generalize to categories makes two additional
predictions: (a) the magnitude of this asymmetry in memory errors (i.e., more “all”-to-
generic than generic-to-“all” conversion errors) should be greater when the facts con-
cern generalizable properties than when they concern idiosyncratic properties; and (b)
this property effect should be observed even when participants have few cognitive
resources available.
To test these predictions, we calculated the difference score between “all”-to-generic
and generic-to-“all” memory conversions, separately for the generalizable and the idio-
syncratic properties. This calculation proceeded in two steps. First, we calculated the
percentage of statements that were originally presented in “all” form that were instead
recalled in generic form, and the percentage of statements originally presented in generic
form that were instead recalled in “all” form. These conversion scores were calculated
for each individual participant, separately for the generalizable and idiosyncratic proper-
ties. Second, we took each participant’s percentages of “all”-to-generic conversions and
subtracted from them the participant’s percentages of generic-to-“all” conversions, again
separately for the generalizable and idiosyncratic properties. Thus, each participant
received two final difference scores (one for each property type), which we will refer to
as generalization-bias scores from here on.
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Our predictions can be assessed by testing, first, whether participants’ generalization-
bias scores are higher for facts that describe generalizable properties than for facts that
describe idiosyncratic properties, and second, whether this difference is present both when
cognitive resources are intact and when they are taxed.
1.2. Results
1.2.1. Data analysis strategy
Participants’ generalization-bias scores clustered in the upper half of the range and
were thus non-normally distributed (Shapiro–Wilk test, p < .001). Because of this viola-
tion of parametric assumptions, we analyzed the data using ordinal logistic regressions
(OLRs) computed using the Generalized Estimating Equations command in SPSS (IBM
Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). Cognitive load was a between-subjects factor in this analysis,
and property type was a within-subject factor.6
1.2.2. Cognitive load manipulation checks
If participants in the cognitive load condition complied with our instructions to
rehearse the string of digits provided by the experimenter, then they should have reason-
ably accurate memory for these digits. Very poor digit recall is most likely a sign that
the subjects did not rehearse the digits and were not actually under a cognitive load (see
Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, for a similar argument). Thus, we excluded from the analyses
any subjects whose average digit memory scores were below 2 on the 1–5 scale described
in the Method (n = 13; Mdigit memory = 1.37). This left 81 subjects in the cognitive load
condition. (Note that all of the significant results reported below remain significant even
if these subjects are not excluded.)
As an additional check that the 81 remaining cognitive load participants were indeed
under a load, we tested their accuracy on the primary task (fact recall) relative to the
participants in the no-load condition. If the cognitive load was effective, participants in
this condition should have less accurate memory compared to participants in the no-load
condition. Consistent with this prediction, cognitive load participants were significantly
less likely than no-load participants to recall the facts in the correct form (Ms = 38.0%
and 52.2% of responses were recalled in the correct form, respectively), Wald
v²(1) = 28.89, p < .001, d = 0.75. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that our cogni-
tive load manipulation was successful in inducing different cognitive demands on the
two groups of participants.
1.2.3. First prediction: A main effect of property type
To reiterate, we proposed that people are biased to spontaneously generalize to kinds.
In the context of our task, this bias might prompt spontaneous generalizations to the kind
level especially when the evidence warrants such generalizations. Thus, when a novel
property is generalizable—the sort of property that is typically true of kinds—participants
may be particularly likely to use the quantified evidence at hand (e.g., “All zorbs eat
fruits and vegetables”) to implicitly infer something about the kind itself (e.g., zorbs, as a
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kind, have this sort of diet). These generalizations, should they occur, would lead to
higher generalization-bias scores for generalizable properties than for idiosyncratic prop-
erties. In line with this prediction, the OLR revealed a significant main effect of property
type, such that participants had higher generalization-bias scores for facts about generaliz-
able properties (M = 24.1% more “all”-to-generic than generic-to-”all” conversions) than
for facts about idiosyncratic properties (M = 16.0%), Wald v²(1) = 12.11, p = .001,
d = .13 (see also Table 2 and the Appendix).
As a reminder, participants’ generalization-bias scores are calculated as the difference
between their “all”-to-generic and generic-to-“all” conversions. However, it is the “all”-
to-generic conversions that are of most interest to us here because they are the direct
by-products of the hypothesized bias to generalize to kinds. Therefore, we also tested
whether these key “all”-to-generic conversions were significantly more common for the
generalizable than the idiosyncratic properties. Indeed, as predicted, participants were sig-
nificantly more likely to misrecall “all” facts as generic when the facts described general-
izable properties (M = 48.0% of “all” facts) than when they described idiosyncratic
properties (M = 41.7%), Wilcoxon Z = 3.62, p < .001.
We also explored whether the effect of property type held up at the level of indi-
vidual participants. Specifically, we compared the number of participants who had
higher generalization-bias scores for the generalizable than for the idiosyncratic
properties with the number of participants who had the opposite pattern (higher gener-
alization-bias scores for idiosyncratic properties). Consistent with our prediction, there
were significantly more participants with higher generalization-bias scores for the gen-
eralizable properties (37.9% of participants) than participants with higher generaliza-
tion-bias scores for the idiosyncratic properties (17.8% of participants), p < .001 by a
sign test.
Finally, it is worth noting that participants’ generalization-bias scores were signifi-
cantly greater than zero, both for the generalizable properties (one-sample Wilcoxon test,
Z = 4.92, p < .001) and for the idiosyncratic properties (one-sample Wilcoxon test,
Z = 3.13, p = .002), indicating that there were significantly more “all”-to-generic than
generic-to-“all” conversions for both of these types of facts. These differences are consis-
tent with prior arguments that suggest generic facts impose a lower processing burden rel-
ative to quantified facts (e.g., Leslie & Gelman, 2012).
1.2.4. Second prediction: An effect of property type in both the cognitive load and the
no-load conditions
We also hypothesized that the bias to generalize to kinds operates without much cogni-
tive effort. Thus, our second prediction was that this bias should influence participants’
memory, regardless of whether or not they are asked to perform another task while listen-
ing to the experimenter’s facts. In other words, we predicted that there would be a statis-
tically significant effect of property type in both the no-load and the cognitive-load
conditions.
Consistent with our prediction, participants’ generalization-bias scores were higher for
statements that described generalizable properties than for statements that described
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idiosyncratic properties both in the no-load condition, Wald v²(1) = 6.63, p = .010,
d = 0.15, and in the cognitive- load condition, Wald v²(1) = 5.41, p = .020, d = 0.12. In
addition, there was no significant difference between the magnitude of the property type
effect in each load condition, as the OLR revealed no trace of an interaction between
property type and cognitive-load, Wald v²(1) = 0.08, p = .78 (see Table 2 and the Appen-
dix for means).7
Individual participants’ response patterns pointed to the same conclusion: There
were significantly more participants who had higher generalization-bias scores for the
generalizable (vs. the idiosyncratic) properties than participants who had higher scores for
the idiosyncratic (vs. the generalizable) properties in both the no-load and the cognitive-
load conditions, ps = .005 and .053, respectively, by sign tests.
1.3. Discussion
To summarize, we found that participants were more likely to misremember quantified
facts as generic (rather than vice-versa) when these facts were about properties that are
typically generalizable to a kind (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”) than when
they were about properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., “All stups get mud
in their hair”). This finding is in line with our main proposal that people are biased to
make spontaneous kind generalizations and are therefore likely to generalize quantified
evidence to kinds even in circumstances where such generalizations interfere with correct
performance.
There is, however, an alternative explanation for these findings. Perhaps people do not
generalize the quantified evidence about generalizable properties to the relevant kinds, as
we hypothesized. Rather, universally quantified and generic statements may simply be
closer in their meaning—and thus more confusable—when they describe generalizable
properties than when they describe idiosyncratic properties. For instance, hearing that
“zorbs eat fruits and vegetables” might lead people to expect that the vast majority of
zorbs do so (Cimpian et al., 2010), which would then make this statement similar in
meaning with a statement such as “all zorbs eat fruits and vegetables.” If generic and
“all” statements are seen as meaning roughly the same thing in this particular case, then
people might just produce the shorter of the two statements at recall, leading to an
increased rate of “all”-to-generic conversions compared to generic-to-“all” conversions.
(Again, no kind generalizations of the sort we hypothesize are invoked by this alternative
account.) In contrast, generic statements about idiosyncratic properties (e.g., “Stups get
mud in their hair”) may not be seen as being similar/confusable in meaning with the cor-
responding universally quantified statements (e.g., “All stups get mud in their hair”), in
part because generics about such properties suggest relatively low prevalence levels (Cim-
pian et al., 2010, Experiment 3). For idiosyncratic properties, then, people may be less
inclined to use the shorter generic statements as stand-ins for universally quantified
statements (because their meanings are not seen as interchangeable), leading to lower,
and more symmetrical, numbers of “all”-to-generic and generic-to-“all” errors.
1032 S. L. Sutherland et al. / Cognitive Science 39 (2015)
Although intuitively plausible, this alternative cannot explain other aspects of the
results obtained in Experiment 1. For example, if generic and “all” statements are more
confusable for generalizable properties, then it is hard to explain why the percentage of
correct responses for these properties (M = 46.5%) was nearly identical to the percentage
of correct responses for the supposedly less-confusable generic and “all” statements about
idiosyncratic properties (M = 44.8%; Wilcoxon Z = 1.23, p = .22). The confusability
alternative straightforwardly predicts that people should be correct less often for the
generalizable properties. This result, however, is suggestive but not conclusive, so we
conducted Experiment 2 to provide a more definitive test of this alternative explanation.
Specifically, we measured and statistically adjusted for the perceived similarity/confus-
ability of “all” and generic statements about generalizable and idiosyncratic properties. If
the confusability alternative is correct, then taking participants’ judgments of meaning
similarity into account when testing for an effect of property type should eliminate the
difference in generalization-bias scores observed in Experiment 1. In contrast, we pre-
dicted that the effect of property type on generalization-bias scores would replicate even
when controlling for this measure of similarity/confusability.
2. Experiment 2
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Eighty-six participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform and
completed the study online. All were native English speakers residing in the United
States. The reward for participation was $0.75.
2.1.2. Items
We used the same items as in Experiment 1.
2.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was similar to the no-load condition of Experiment 1, with a few method-
ological changes necessitated by (a) the switch from in-lab to online testing; and (b) the
addition of the key control variable of this experiment (namely, similarity/confusability).
The changes were as follows. First, instead of listening to the sentences while looking
at a booklet, participants read the sentences on their computer screens, each on a separate
page. Each page was programmed to automatically advance after 15 s to equate encoding
time across sentences. To ensure that the participants attended to the stimulus sentences,
we also required them to type out these sentences in a text box on the page on which
they were displayed. Second, the distractor phase was shortened to 2 min rather than
four. A 2-min delay is more in line with the brevity of typical studies on Mechanical
Turk, and yet it is still long enough to ensure that participants had to rely on long-term
memory at recall (e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1959). Third, the distractor task consisted of
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arithmetic problems that could be solved without needing a pen and paper, unlike the
multidigit multiplication problems used in Experiment 1. Fourth, to assess the similarity/
confusability of “all” and generic statements describing generalizable and idiosyncratic
properties, we presented participants with all 16 pairs of generic and “all” statements
(e.g., “Stups get mud in their hair” and “All stups get mud in their hair”; see Table 1)
and asked them to rate how similar in meaning these pairs were (“How similar are the
meanings of these two sentences?”). Participants marked their answers on a 10-point scale
(from 1 = “very dissimilar” to 10 = “very similar”). Each pair was presented on a differ-
ent screen. The order of the 16 pairs was randomized for each subject. Also, the order in
which the generic and “all” sentences were displayed within the pairs was randomized
across participants. These rating questions were always presented after the recall phase so
as to not interfere with the memory task.
Because online testing makes cheating on the memory task a possibility, at the very
end of the session we asked participants to report whether they had written down, copied,
or used any other external sources to help them remember the sentences. To encourage
truthful responses, we made it very clear to participants that they would receive payment
regardless of how they answered this question. Two participants reported cheating and
were excluded, leaving 84 participants in our sample.
2.1.4. Coding
The coding scheme was the same as in Experiment 1. Intercoder agreement was calcu-
lated over all 84 transcripts and was again excellent: Cohen’s kappas for the generic,
“all,” and “other” coding categories were .97, .99, and .94, respectively. Disagreements
were resolved through discussion.
2.1.5. Dependent measures
Generalization-bias scores were calculated just as in Experiment 1, by taking the dif-
ference between “all”-to-generic and generic-to-“all” memory conversions separately for
the generalizable and the idiosyncratic properties. Participants’ similarity scores were also
calculated separately for the two property types by averaging the similarity ratings for the
eight generalizable items and the eight idiosyncratic items.
2.2. Results and discussion
Our claim is that people make more asymmetric memory errors (more “all”-to-generic
than generic-to-“all” conversions) for generalizable than for idiosyncratic properties
because of an implicit bias to generalize to kinds, and not because of low-level factors
having to do with the confusability of generic and universally quantified statements
describing these types of properties. Thus, we predicted that generalization-bias scores
would be significantly higher for the generalizable than for the idiosyncratic properties
even when adjusting for any differences between the similarity/confusability of “all” and
generic statements about the two property types.
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To begin, we examined whether such similarity/confusability differences exist in the
first place. Participants did in fact rate universally quantified and generic statements as
being more similar when they described generalizable properties (M = 8.34 on a 1–10
scale, SD = 1.37) than when they described idiosyncratic properties (M = 8.05,
SD = 1.56), Wilcoxon Z = 3.63, p < .001. Importantly, however, this difference did not
account for the difference found between generalization-bias scores for generalizable and
idiosyncratic facts. We submitted participants’ generalization-bias scores to an OLR with
property type (generalizable vs. idiosyncratic) as a predictor and similarity/confusability
scores as a covariate. As predicted, the main effect of property type was replicated even
when controlling for the similarity variable: Participants had significantly higher general-
ization-bias scores for the generalizable properties (M = 34.5% more “all”-to-generic than
generic-to-”all” conversions) than for the idiosyncratic properties (M = 25.3%), Wald
v²(1) = 7.37, p = .007, d = .15. (We report unadjusted means here, in Table 2, and in the
Appendix.) Moreover, the similarity/confusability covariate was not a significant predictor
of generalization-bias scores, Wald v²(1) = 1.11, p = .29.8,9
When we considered only participants’ “all”-to-generic conversions, we found that
these conversions (which are most pertinent to our argument of a bias to generalize to
kinds) were more likely for facts that described generalizable properties (M = 56.8% of
“all” facts) than for facts that described idiosyncratic properties (M = 47.6%), Wilcoxon
Z = 3.31, p = .001.
Finally, as in Experiment 1, the main effect of property type was replicated at the level
of individual participants. There were significantly more participants with generalization-
bias scores in the predicted direction (generalizable > idiosyncratic; 33.3%) than
participants with generalization-bias scores in the unpredicted direction (idiosyn-
cratic > generalizable; 14.3%), p = .017 by a sign test.
These findings speak against the possibility that participants’ responses in our task are
due to a similarity/confusability confound. Instead, it seems more likely that participants
are spontaneously generalizing the provided quantified information to the relevant kinds
whenever appropriate, revealing an implicit bias to generalize to kinds.
3. Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we addressed an additional alternative explanation for our findings.
According to this alternative, participants’ responses in Experiments 1 and 2 could have
been driven entirely by the clues given during the recall phase. To elaborate, the clue
words provided for the generalizable properties in those experiments were slightly differ-
ent in content from the clue words provided for the idiosyncratic properties (see Table 1):
More of the clues for generalizable properties referred to typical animal habitats (e.g.,
ocean, mountain) and diets (e.g., vegetables). Given that elements such as habitats and
diets often figure in kind-wide properties, participants who saw these clues during the
recall phase may have been artificially induced to generate statements about kinds even if
they had not drawn any kind inferences from the original statements (or, for that matter,
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even if they did not remember anything about the original statements). It is possible,
then, that this asymmetry in the content of the memory clues used in the first two studies
might explain the greater number of “all”-to-generic (vs. generic-to-“all”) errors for gen-
eralizable properties than for idiosyncratic properties. Experiment 3 was conducted to
investigate this alternative explanation. Specifically, we presented a new group of partici-
pants with the clues (both pictures and words) given during the recall phase of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 and asked them to generate either generic or universally quantified
statements using these clues. If the clues alone were driving our effect, we should find
more generic responses for the clues provided for generalizable properties in the first two
studies compared to clues provided for the idiosyncratic properties. In contrast, we predict
that there will be no difference in the number of generic responses between the two sets
of clues.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Eighty-seven participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform
and completed the study online. All were native English speakers residing in the United
States. The reward for participation was $0.75.
3.1.2. Procedure
We asked participants to create sentences using exactly the same clues that were shown
in the recall phase of Experiments 1 and 2. We also provided a few rules to guide partici-
pants’ sentence creation; these rules were meant to ensure that their expectations about the
types of sentences they were supposed to generate were similar to those of participants
who had previously gone through a learning phase (Experiments 1 and 2). Specifically, we
asked participants to (a) generate full sentences, to (b) begin their sentences with either
bare plural nouns (e.g., “zorbs”) or universally quantified nouns (e.g., “all zorbs”); and to
(c) avoid using the same type of beginning across all 16 sentences they would be asked to
create. Participants were also told that the second clue could be used in another form than
it was given (“For example, if you are given the word “eye,” you can use the word “eyes”
in your sentence instead”). These rules were reiterated on each trial, so that participants
did not have to remember them. Across participants, we randomized the order in which the
two types of noun phrases (bare plural and universally quantified) were mentioned in the
rules, so as to avoid biasing participants toward using one or the other.
3.1.3. Coding
The same coding criteria were used as in Experiments 1 and 2. However, because the
instructions provided in this study explicitly limited participants’ responses to sentences
beginning with bare plural nouns or universally quantified nouns, there were almost no
responses that were ambiguous in scope.10 As a result, we did not ask a second researcher
to code participants’ responses in this study.
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3.2. Results and discussion
There was no difference in the number of generic sentences participants generated for
clues previously provided for facts describing generalizable properties (M = 60.1% of all
responses) and for clues previously provided for facts describing idiosyncratic properties
(M = 61.4%), Wilcoxon Z = 0.72, p = .47.11 This result suggests that our findings in
Experiments 1 and 2—namely, the higher generalization-bias scores for generalizable
properties than for idiosyncratic properties—were not an artifact of the clues provided
during the recall phase. Instead, it is more likely that participants were actually
misremembering the quantified generalizable facts as being about the relevant categories,
arguably because of the hypothesized bias to make kind generalizations.
4. Experiment 4
We are proposing that humans are biased to generalize information about quantified
sets to the level of entire kinds. So far, however, the quantified evidence we have pro-
vided to participants was extremely strong: namely, that all members of a kind exhibit a
certain feature. Kind generalizations based on universally quantified evidence are, of
course, easy to make. For a stronger test of our proposal, in Experiment 4 we asked
whether people would still make spontaneous kind generalizations (and the errors caused
by these generalizations) if the quantified information were weaker. Specifically, we
tested whether people would spontaneously generalize information about many members
of a kind to the kind itself.12
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
One hundred and two participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
platform and completed the study online. All were native English speakers residing in the
United States. The reward for participation was $0.75. Three additional participants were
tested but excluded from the sample because (a) they reported cheating (n = 2), or (b)
answered “1” to all 30 arithmetic questions during a distractor block, which suggested
they did not take the survey seriously (n = 1).
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
We used the same items as in Experiments 1 and 2, except that the sentences quanti-
fied with “all” were replaced with sentences quantified with “many.” The procedure was
the same as that in Experiment 2 (that is, online testing with a similarity control).
4.1.3. Coding
The coding was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, except the “all” coding category
was replaced with an analogous “many” category (e.g., “Many stupps get something in
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their hair”). A second researcher coded the responses of approximately 25% of the partic-
ipants (n = 25) to assess reliability. Cohen’s kappas were .94, .97, and .92, for the gen-
eric, “many,” and “other” categories, respectively, indicating excellent agreement.
4.2. Results and discussion
Even though the quantified evidence was weaker in this experiment, we predicted
that participants would still spontaneously generalize it (when appropriate) to the rele-
vant kinds, which would lead to higher generalization-bias scores for the generalizable
properties relative to the idiosyncratic properties. The results supported this prediction.
Participants’ generalization-bias scores were significantly higher for facts that described
generalizable properties (M = 57.4% more “many”-to-generic than generic-to-“many”
conversions) than for facts that described idiosyncratic properties (M = 50.0%), even
when controlling for the perceived similarity in meaning of the “many” and generic facts,
Wald v²(1) = 5.11, p = .024, d = .17.13,14 Also, as in Experiment 2, participants’ per-
ceived similarity between the meaning of the “many” and generic statements did not
predict their generalization-bias scores, Wald v²(1) = 0.06, p = .80. When we considered
only the percentage of “many”-to-generic conversions (rather than the generalization-bias
scores as a whole), we again found more of these key conversions for generalizable
properties (M = 63.5% of “many” facts) than for idiosyncratic properties (M = 57.1%),
Wilcoxon Z = 2.22, p = .026.
An analysis of individual participants’ response patterns revealed that, as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, there were more participants who showed the predicted pattern (higher
generalization-bias scores for the generalizable than the idiosyncratic properties) than par-
ticipants who showed the opposite pattern (36.3% vs. 23.5% of participants, respectively).
However, this difference did not reach statistical significance in this study, p = .12, by a
sign test.
These findings provide additional support for the proposed bias to generalize to kinds.
Even though the quantified statements in this experiment provided weaker evidence than
those in Experiments 1 and 2, people nevertheless spontaneously generalized the informa-
tion they conveyed to the corresponding kinds, which in turn interfered with participants’
ability to perform well on the memory task.
5. General discussion
We proposed that humans exhibit a powerful bias to spontaneously generalize to kinds.
To test this claim, we used a task that—unlike most other research on kind generaliza-
tions—provided no prompts to generalize. In fact, this task (modified from Leslie & Gel-
man, 2012) arguably discouraged participants from making generalizations because the
goal of the task was simply to memorize a series of generic and quantified statements.
We found that participants made the precise pattern of errors one would expect to see if
they were implicitly, spontaneously formulating category generalizations based on the
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quantified statements: That is, participants were more likely to misremember quantified
statements as generic (rather than the reverse) when those statements described generaliz-
able properties as opposed to when they described idiosyncratic properties. We also found
this increased rate of memory errors for the generalizable properties when participants
were under additional cognitive demands (Experiment 1), suggesting that the hypothe-
sized generalization bias can operate “under the radar,” without taking up much cognitive
capacity. Finally, our findings ruled out two alternative explanations. In Experiments 2
and 4, we found that the predicted difference in generalization-bias scores between facts
that describe generalizable and idiosyncratic properties persisted when controlling for the
perceived similarity/confusability of the quantified and generic forms of these facts.
Moreover, in Experiment 3 we demonstrated that the clues provided in the recall phase
of the memory experiments could not have been responsible for the differences observed
in generalization-bias scores. Together, these studies support our proposal that people are
biased to make kind generalizations—to spontaneously generalize novel information to
kinds whenever such generalizations are justifiable.
To highlight the striking nature of these results, we should point out that there are valid
considerations that could have prompted participants to convert the quantified statements
about idiosyncratic properties to generic form, which would have led to a pattern opposite
of what we actually observed. Typically, idiosyncratic properties of the sort used in our
study apply to fewer category members than generalizable properties do (e.g., the norming
study in the Method of Experiment 1; Cimpian et al., 2010). As a result, quantified state-
ments that imply idiosyncratic properties are highly prevalent (e.g., “All/Many stups get
mud in their hair”) are less plausible than analogous statements about generalizable prop-
erties (e.g., “All/Many zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”). In principle, then, participants
could have preferred to convert the quantified statements about idiosyncratic properties to
generic form because generic statements can plausibly be true even if there is little statis-
tical evidence to support them (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010; Leslie, 2008). The fact that
participants converted instead more of the quantified statements about generalizable prop-
erties to generic form, despite the fact that they were plausible as is, strengthens our claim
that participants’ behavior in our task was driven by a bias to generalize to kinds.
It is also important to note that the present results cannot be fully explained by, and
thus go beyond, an ease-of-processing bias of the sort previously proposed in the litera-
ture (e.g., Hampton, 2012; Leslie & Gelman, 2012). If the only factor driving partici-
pants’ responses in our task had been a relative difference in the difficulty of processing
quantified and generic statements (with quantified statements being more effort-intensive
to understand, evaluate, store, etc., than generic statements), then participants should have
converted an equal number of quantified statements to generic form across the two prop-
erty types. The ease-of-processing account alone does not predict that quantified state-
ments vary in their computational complexity depending on whether they refer to, say,
eating fruits and vegetables or getting mud in one’s hair. Thus, the greater asymmetry
between the number of quantified-to-generic and generic-to-quantified memory conver-
sions we observed for generalizable relative to idiosyncratic properties is consistent with,
and was predicted a priori by, our argument that human cognition is biased to generalize
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evidence about quantified samples to the entire relevant kinds whenever such generaliza-
tions are warranted. From a broader perspective, the presence of such a bias is likely to
have a powerful impact on the development of our conceptual knowledge, facilitating
the acquisition of a tremendous amount of category knowledge from experience with
particular samples.
We should also clarify that the present evidence for a bias to generalize to kinds does
not speak against the ease-of-processing account. In fact, in our experiments we consis-
tently found more conversions from quantified facts to generic facts than conversions in
the opposite direction, for both the generalizable and the idiosyncratic properties. This
overall conversion asymmetry replicates Leslie and Gelman’s (2012) findings and is in
line with their arguments that reasoning about generic facts is less cognitively demanding
than reasoning about quantified facts. Therefore, the generalization bias and the ease-of-
processing bias are likely to operate in tandem to influence how people learn about the
world.
Returning to the present studies, our results also suggest that the bias to draw kind
inferences might operate without making many demands on cognitive resources. We base
this conclusion on the fact that the effect of property type (i.e., higher generalization-bias
scores for generalizable than for idiosyncratic properties) was as strong for participants
who were under a cognitive load as it was for those who were not. Thus, the implicit bias
to generalize to kinds may function not just when people have the luxury of explicitly
focusing on learning about categories. Rather, this fundamental bias probably operates in
most everyday circumstances, even when we are engaged in other activities and not
deliberately trying to acquire generic knowledge.
Our proposal of a bias to generalize to kinds is compatible in spirit with previous
hypotheses and evidence from the developmental literature that highlight the privileged
status of kind representations in human cognition. Consider, for example, the recent
claims of an early—perhaps even innate—sensitivity to social cues that signal the trans-
mission of generic knowledge (Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009). To illustrate, communica-
tive cues such as eye contact and pointing to an object lead 9-month-olds to encode and
remember kind-relevant properties of that object (e.g., shape, color) rather than kind-irrel-
evant ones (e.g., location; Yoon, Johnson, & Csibra, 2008; see also Butler & Markman,
2012; Futo, Teglas, Csibra, & Gergely, 2010). Such ostensive/pedagogical contexts have
also been shown to elicit higher rates of generic language (Gelman, Ware, Manczak, &
Graham, 2013), which provides a very effective means of conveying generic knowledge
and is understood by children as young as 2 and 3 (e.g., Cimpian & Markman, 2008;
Cimpian, Meltzer, & Markman, 2011; Gelman & Raman, 2003; Graham, Nayer, & Gel-
man, 2011). Also related to our present argument, Cimpian and Erickson (2012) demon-
strated that preschool-aged children are better able to recall information that pertains to a
kind compared to identical information about an individual. Children’s ability to retain
kind knowledge faithfully in long-term memory dovetails nicely with the proposed bias
to generalize to kinds and thereby acquire such kind knowledge.
In conclusion, the current findings suggest that the human mind may be biased to make
spontaneous kind generalizations whenever the evidence at hand allows such generaliza-
1040 S. L. Sutherland et al. / Cognitive Science 39 (2015)
tions. This bias is likely to exert a powerful—yet often unnoticed—influence on our
learning, guiding us toward knowledge at the level of abstract kinds.
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Notes
1. We use the term generalization to a category as roughly synonymous with infer-
ence about a category. Thus, the hypothesized bias to spontaneously generalize to
categories may also be understood as a bias to draw spontaneous inferences about
the features of categories. While there may be differences of opinion as to
whether using a universally quantified statement to derive a generic conclusion
counts as a generalization per se, this is certainly a non-trivial inductive inference,
as quantified statements do not express facts about kinds (e.g., Carlson & Pelle-
tier, 1995; Cimpian et al., 2010; Leslie, 2008).
2. Approximately half of the participants received a slight variant of this procedure,
in which (a) the booklets used during the learning phase listed the same two clues
as those in the recall phase (rather than no clues), and (b) the cognitive-load con-
dition involved rehearsing a string of eight digits (rather than six). Because this
procedural variant did not interact significantly with either of the variables of
interest (property type and cognitive load), we report the data collapsed across it.
3. The vast majority of sentences coded as generic had either bare plural noun
phrases (e.g., “Reesles like to swim in the ocean”) or indefinite singular noun
phrases (e.g., “A dax stores its food in its cheeks”) in the subject position. How-
ever, we also coded as generic a number of sentences with (what appeared to be)
bare singular noun phrases in the subject position (e.g., “Glippet keep their nests
on mountain peaks”). This coding decision was based on the assumption that
some participants may have been unsure of how to pluralize the novel nouns pro-
vided (e.g., some may have thought that the plural of glippet may be glippet, on
analogy with sheep or deer). This latter type of generic accounted for only 5.3%
of responses coded as generic. Moreover, when the data were analyzed without
these generics, the results replicated those reported in the main text. Also note that
we did not code definite singular noun phrases as generic. Even though such noun
phrases can in principle refer to a kind, their generic use is rare (e.g., Gelman,
Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998). Moreover, as one of the clues
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provided to participants was a picture of a single exemplar from the relevant cate-
gory, the task context made it very likely that subjects’ definite singular nouns
(e.g., “the oller”) were referring to the exemplars on the page in front of them.
4. The 19.4% “other” responses consisted of 11.8% responses about single instances
(Mgeneralizable = 10.6%; Midiosyncratic = 13.0%) and 7.6% responses that had inde-
terminate scope (the latter percentage includes skipped responses).
5. The intermediary scale points were labeled as follows: 2 [very few correct num-
bers in the correct order], 3 [some of the correct numbers in the correct order],
and 4 [minor errors (e.g., one number missing or out of order)].
6. Despite the assumption violations, the results of the OLRs were replicated with
analyses of variance (ANOVAs).
7. The main effect of cognitive load was not significant either, Mno load = 18.3% vs.
Mcognitive load = 22.1% more “all”-to-generic than generic-to-“all” conversions,
Wald v²(1) = 0.15, p = .70, d = 0.06.
8. The same results were found with a repeated-measures ANOVA with similarity/conf-
usability as a covariate.
9. As an additional means of investigating whether the difference in similarity/conf-
usability was related to the difference in generalization-bias scores between gener-
alizable and idiosyncratic properties, we calculated the correlation between (a) a
generalization-bias difference score (generalization-bias score for generalizable
properties minus generalization-bias score for idiosyncratic properties); and (b) a
similarity/confusability difference score (similarity score for generalizable proper-
ties minus similarity score for idiosyncratic properties). This correlation was non-
significant, r(82) = .08, p = .45, which speaks against the alternative hypothesis
tested here and is consistent with the non-significant covariate effect reported in
the main text.
10. Although instructing participants to begin their sentence with a bare plural does
not guarantee that they will produce a generic statement, in fact in this study they
almost always did.
11. Participants produced more generic responses than would be expected by chance
(50%) for both sets of clues, one-sample Wilcoxon Zs = 4.27 and 4.79, ps < .001,
for the generalizable and the idiosyncratic property clues, respectively.
12. In principle, our argument applies to quantified evidence that is even weaker. In
the context of our paradigm, however, scalar implicature may block kind general-
izations from evidence conveyed via statements with weaker quantifiers. For
example, if subjects heard that “some zorbs eat fruits and vegetables,” they might
infer that most actually do not, which might block the relevant generalization to
zorbs as a kind. This is a problem specifically when the evidence is conveyed lin-
guistically via quantified sentences: Actually witnessing some zorbs eating fruits
and vegetables would be perfectly compatible with a kind inference.
13. The average similarity rating for “many” and generic facts that described general-
izable properties (M = 7.70) was not statistically different from the average rating
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for facts that describe idiosyncratic properties (M = 7.63), Wilcoxon Z = 1.50,
p = .14.
14. The generalization-bias scores are generally higher here than in Experiment 2
(which used the quantifier “all”). This difference seems to be driven in part by the
fact that generic-to-“many” conversions were less frequent in this experiment than
generic-to-“all” conversions had been in Experiment 2 (see Table 2). One possible
reason for this difference might be that “all” statements were seen as more similar
in meaning to generic statements than “many” statements were, as revealed by
participants’ similarity ratings. Thus, participants may have been more likely to
accidentally misremember generic statements as being about all rather than many
members of a kind. However, this greater similarity of “all” and generic state-
ments did not similarly boost “all”-to-generic conversions, which were actually
slightly lower than “many”-to-generic conversions. This further speaks against the
possibility that confusability of meaning was responsible for the crucial quanti-
fied-to-generic conversions in our studies (see the discussion of this alternative
explanation in Experiment 2).
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Appendix
Table A1
Raw averages for various measures in Experiments 1, 2, and 4, by property type and cog-
nitive load (standard deviations in parentheses below)
Measure
Generalizable Properties Idiosyncratic Properties
Exp. 1
(CL)
Exp. 1
(NL)
Exp. 2
(“all”)
Exp. 4
(“many”)
Exp. 1
(CL)
Exp. 1
(NL)
Exp. 2
(“all”)
Exp. 4
(“many”)
Generalization-bias score
(quantified-to-generic
minus generic-to-
quantified conversions)
1.02
(2.50)
0.91
(2.47)
1.38
(2.40)
2.29
(1.70)
0.74
(2.43)
0.55
(2.54)
1.01
(2.36)
2.00
(1.68)
Quantified-to-generic
conversions
(originally presented
“all”/“many” statements
recalled as generic)
1.91
(1.64)
1.92
(1.48)
2.27
(1.49)
2.54
(1.43)
1.59
(1.51)
1.73
(1.37)
1.90
(1.48)
2.28
(1.43)
Quantified—correct
(originally presented
“all” or “many” statements
recalled as “all” or “many,”
respectively)
1.11
(1.35)
1.66
(1.49)
1.19
(1.39)
0.59
(0.94)
1.14
(1.35)
1.78
(1.48)
1.51
(1.42)
0.66
(0.90)
Quantified—other
(originally presented
“all”/”many” statements
recalled as neither “all”/
”many” nor generic)
0.98
(1.26)
0.42
(0.97)
0.54
(1.16)
0.87
(1.26)
1.27
(1.41)
0.48
(0.93)
0.58
(1.08)
1.06
(1.42)
Generic-to-quantified
conversions
(originally presented
generic
statements recalled as
“all”/”many”)
0.89
(1.18)
1.01
(1.28)
0.89
(1.25)
0.25
(0.64)
0.85
(1.24)
1.18
(1.44)
0.89
(1.21)
0.28
(0.65)
Generic—correct
(originally presented
generic statements
recalled as generic)
2.01
(1.55)
2.58
(1.42)
2.58
(1.43)
2.87
(1.33)
1.83
(1.59)
2.33
(1.48)
2.48
(1.38)
2.73
(1.35)
Generic—other
(originally presented
generic statements
recalled as neither
generic nor “all”/”many”)
1.10
(1.35)
0.41
(0.92)
0.52
(1.08)
0.88
(1.20)
1.32
(1.38)
0.48
(1.03)
0.63
(1.19)
0.99
(1.36)
Note. CL = cognitive load. NL = no load. The three quantified rows add up to four (within each column),
as do the three generic rows.
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